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Introduction
We propose to analyse quantum protocols by apply-
ing the formal verification techniques developed in
classical computing for the analysis of communicat-
ing concurrent systems. Typically, the first step in
formal verification is to define a model of the sys-
tem to be analysed, in a well-founded mathematical
notation. Experience has shown that this step in
itself is a valuable way of eliminating ambiguities
from an informal description of the system. Next,
an automated analysis tool, based on the same un-
derlying theory, is used to reason about the system.
This might consist either of checking that the system
is behaviourally equivalent to another system which
is viewed as a specification, or of checking that the
system satisfies properties expressed in a separate
specification language.
One area of successful application of these tech-
niques is that of classical security protocols [16], ex-
emplified by Lowe’s [12] discovery and fix of a flaw
in the well-known Needham-Schroeder authentica-
tion protocol which had been proposed several years
previously. Secure quantum cryptographic protocols
are also notoriously difficult to design: although pro-
tocols for quantum bit-commitment [6] were believed
to be secure for several years, it has recently been
shown not only that such protocols are insecure, but
that secure quantum bit-commitment is impossible
[10, 13]. Quantum cryptography is therefore an ob-
vious and interesting target for formal verification,
and provides our first example; we expect the ap-
proach to be transferable to more general quantum
information processing scenarios.
Our example is the quantum key distribution pro-
tocol proposed by Bennett and Brassard [5], com-
monly referred to as BB84. We present a model
of the protocol in the process calculus CCS [15] and
the results of some initial analyses using the Concur-
rency Workbench of the New Century (CWB-NC)
[1]. Similar work could be carried out with other
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combinations of modelling language and toolset,
such as CSP [9] and FDR [2], or Promela and SPIN
[4].
Proofs of unconditional security of the BB84
protocol exist [14, 11] and we have no reason to
doubt their correctness. Nevertheless, we argue that
the modelling/analysis approach has merit for the
study of this and other quantum security protocols.
Gottesman and Lo [8] point out that “the proof of se-
curity of QKD is a fine theoretical result, but it does
not mean that a real QKD system would be secure.
Some known and unknown security loopholes might
prove to be fatal. Apparently minor quirks of a sys-
tem can provide a lever for an eavesdropper to break
the encryption”. The analysis techniques which we
are proposing can be applied to models at a range
of levels of abstraction, from an idealised description
to a concrete implementation. Moreover, a real sys-
tem for security in information processing has com-
ponents other than key distribution—authentication
or authorisation, for example. In the future, some
of these components may be quantum, but others
could still be classical. We should be able to apply
our methods in a uniform fashion to various com-
ponents and their interactions and thus provide cer-
tification of complex systems. Finally, the analysis
tools are oriented towards debugging: if a desired
property is not satisfied, then their output enables
us to understand the reason.
Modelling BB84
We use a version of the BB84 protocol in which Al-
ice reveals the polarisation basis she used for each
photon as soon as the photon is received and mea-
sured by Bob. The CCS model is based on processes
and actions, both of which may be parameterised.
In this particular model, all parameters are binary
valued.
The quantum communication channel is modelled
by a pair of processes: Empty and Full . The ac-
tion put(d, b) indicates that it is possible to send a
bit d into the channel; the bit is encoded with re-
spect to one of two polarisation bases, represented
by another binary parameter b. A process which ac-
tually sends data into the channel will contain the
complementary action put with a particular choice of
parameters. The dot stands for sequencing, so that
the Empty channel becomes Full after receiving the
data.
Empty = put(d, b).Full(d, b)
A Full channel allows an observer to measure its con-
tents with respect to a particular basis; the channel
then uses the action get to release a binary value,
and becomes Empty . If the basis used for the mea-
surement is different from the basis which was orig-
inally used to encode the transmitted bit, then the
value released by the channel may be either 0 or
1. The + operator indicates nondeterminism. Note
that we are only modelling possibilities, not prob-
abilities. Modelling languages and analysis tools
for probabilistic systems are available, for example
PRISM [3]. Probabilistic modelling and reasoning
about quantum protocols is an area for future work.
Full(d, b) = measure(b′).
if b′ = b then get(d).Empty
else (get(0).Empty + get(1).Empty)
Alice and Bob interact with the channel via the ac-
tions put , measure and get . The actions go, go are
used for additional synchronisation, so that Alice
does not choose and put repeatedly before Bob has
finished processing what he received; this facilitates
later analysis.
Alice = choose(x).(put(x, 0).reveal (0).go.Alice +
put(x, 1).reveal (1).go.Alice)
Bob = measure(0).get(x).(reveal (b).if b = 0
then keep(x).go.Bob else go.Bob)
+ measure(1).get(x).(reveal (b).if b = 1
then keep(x).go.Bob else go.Bob)
The complete protocol, without an eavesdropper,
consists of the parallel composition (operator |) of
Alice, Bob, and an Empty channel. The operator
\{put, get ,measure, go, reveal} indicates that these
actions, and their complements, are hidden; they
are used for internal interaction, but are not visible
outside. Parallel composition means that individual
processes run independently, only synchronising on
actions and their complements. For example, Alice’s
put must synchronise with the put in Empty . This
means that Alice cannot do reveal , synchronising
with Bob, until after Bob has done get ; Alice has
to wait.
BB84 = (Alice|Bob|Empty) \
{put , get ,measure, go, reveal}
An eavesdropper Eve can be modelled similarly, al-
lowing us to define the attacked protocol BB84 ′.
This particular eavesdropper simply guesses a ba-
sis, then measures, extracts and returns the sent bit.
More generally, following a standard approach to the
analysis of classical security protocols, we could con-
sider an eavesdropper who arbitrarily attempts to
use any actions with any parameters derivable from
information available to her.
Eve = measure(0).get(x).put(x, 0).Eve
+ measure(1).get(x).put(x, 1).Eve
BB84 ′ = (Alice|Bob|Eve|Empty) \
{put , get ,measure, go, reveal}
The process Spec can be viewed as a specification of
the protocol in the absence of an eavesdropper. Spec
is a description of how the protocol should behave:
Alice chooses and sends a sequence of bits some of
which Bob can discard (when polarisation bases do
not match) but whenever he keeps a bit it is the same
as what Alice sent. This results in the generation of
a sequence of bits common to both parties—the key.
Spec = choose(x).(Spec + keep(x).Spec)
Analysing BB84
Using the tool CWB-NC, we have established that
BB84 is equivalent to Spec and that BB84 ′ is not
equivalent to Spec. “Equivalent” refers to trace
equivalence, which means equality of the set of pos-
sible sequences of observable actions. The tool dis-
covers that choose(0)keep(1) is a trace of BB84 ′
but not of Spec. This trace arises from an execu-
tion in which Bob measures with the correct ba-
sis but Eve has already corrupted the channel by
measuring with the wrong basis. Alternatively, the
property 〈〈choose(0)〉〉〈〈keep(1)〉〉true (expressed in
the modal µ-calculus) specifies that a process may
choose 0 and end up keeping 1. CWB-NC establishes
that BB84 does not satisfy this property, whereas
BB84 ′ does. This shows the possibility of inter-
ference by Eve. Note that once the processes and
properties have been defined, CWB-NC carries out
verification automatically and without human inter-
vention.
Conclusions and Future Work
We have introduced techniques for formally mod-
elling and analysing quantum protocols. As far as
we are aware, this the first proposal to use formal
modelling and analysis in the field of quantum in-
formation processing. As a specific demonstration,
we have modelled components of the BB84 protocol
in CCS, and analysed the model with the CWB-NC
tool.
Future work will include the development of a
framework based on our initial investigation, for de-
tailed analysis of quantum information systems. We
are already considering tools that enable us to in-
corporate probabilities into our model and we will
also include methods to reason about errors and
error-correction. We aim to be able to generalise
the model of the attacker, in order to analyse collec-
tive or coherent attacks, for example. The modelling
of entanglement-based quantum key distribution [7],
other quantum cryptographic protocols and quan-
tum communication protocols is another goal.
An alternative approach, which we also plan
to investigate, is to use machine-assisted theorem-
proving technology to formalise conventional proofs
about quantum systems, such as the unconditional
security proofs.
Quantum cryptography is already viable and pro-
totype implementations are being seriously consid-
ered. If verification efforts are begun early and pro-
ceed in tandem with implementations, the resulting
systems are likely to be highly secure.
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